Tanking For The Win

Philadelphia 76er fans supporting their team 

Tanking is a model for delayed gratification, and current issue in the NBA. One team embracing it is the Philadelphia 76ers, who have won 32 games within the past two seasons, which is good for a 22% winning percentage. At one point, this team set a record, losing 26 consecutive games. One might ask, why is it in a team’s best interest to lose so much? This post will address one cause of tanking: the NBA Draft.

In the NBA draft, the teams that do not make the playoffs are entered into a lottery for the first pick of an up and coming prospect. The winner of the lottery receives the first pick; guaranteeing them a potential franchise-changing player. In a study conducted by advanced statisticians in the sport of basketball, the number of expected “win shares” was calculated by pick in the draft. Win shares are approximately the number of wins a player is expected to be responsible for contributing. The study concluded that number one overall picks generate 76.9 expected win shares throughout their careers and 26.5 within the first four years of that player’s career (Kubatko). Teams essentially control rookies for the first four years of their careers, given the structure of entry-level contracts, so this 26.5 number is significant. Teams finishing in last place are given the highest odds of obtaining this pick, at 25%. This is significant, as teams want the best chance possible to acquire the next LeBron James or Tim Duncan at this spot of the draft. Looking at teams losing early on in the playoffs- those with the least chance of winning it all anyways- they have 0% odds at the first pick. Also, they can expect about 6.0 to 9.4 win shares from their projected rookie (Kubatko). This is a large discrepancy between the values of a pick from a borderline playoff team and the worst team in the league. Now, putting this into the scope of a five-year period, teams would be best off to tank and accumulate a stockpile of elite talent.

Adding a high level prospect would theoretically increase a team’s chances at winning in the upcoming year; however, picking in the top-five does not necessarily guarantee a franchise-altering player. The ultimate risk teams partake in is choosing to select the next great center or next great guard. In recent years, the biggest example of this debate is the 2007 NBA Draft, featuring Kevin Durant and Greg Oden. After large amounts of debate, the Portland Trailblazers selected eventual bust Greg Oden from Ohio State, passing on eventual NBA MVP Kevin Durant. This is a prime example of a current trend spanning over the past ten years: guards outperforming centers picked in the top-four. Looking at guards selected in the top-four since 2005, they have averaged 6.64 win shares per season, significantly more than centers, who have averaged 4.52. However, expanding this analysis back to 1985, centers averaged 5.84 and guards averaged 5.61 win shares per season (Kartje). This demonstrates the evolving nature of the NBA, as the point guard position has seen a boom of success within recent years. Superstar guards such as Chris Paul, Derrick Rose, and Stephen Curry have replaced big men superstars such as Shaquille O’Neal, David Robinson, and Hakeem Olajuwon.

Given the current trend of guard success, maybe teams should have given D’Angelo Russell or Emmanuel Mudiay a better look in this year’s draft, and paused when considering Jahlil Okafor or Karl-Anthony Towns. However, only time will tell whom the true winners of the draft are.

The 2015 NBA draft results

By Luc Maynor 

Class of 2018

A-Rod ‘Snubbed’?

Number one draft pick in 1993.  2,646 total games played in his Major League career.  670 career homeruns.  Career batting average just under .300.  14 time All Star, three time American League MVP, two time Gold Glove Award winner, World Series Champion.  These and numerous other awards and accolades are all items that Alex Rodriguez’s résumé currently boasts.  15 time All Star though?  Not this year.  With 77 hits, 16 homeruns, 47 RBIs and an on base percentage nearing .400, A-Rod’s numbers did not reserve him a spot of the coveted All Star roster for the 2015 season.  Did he deserve a spot on the roster?  The question has the sports world buzzing.

As talked about and debated by various sports broadcasters such as Mike Golic and Mike Greenberg on their daily radio show “Mike & Mike”, Collin Cowherd on his show “The Herd,” and other ESPN analysts, many seem to blame the MLB for putting too much emphasis on the All Star Game itself.  The game, known as the “Midsummer Classic”, which was first played in 1933, is surrounded by an entire weekend of sports festivities, such as the Home Run Derby and other off-field fan favorites.  It provides some much needed relaxation and rest for not only the players but the fans as well.  Let’s take a closer look though.  The MLB All Star Game, although supposedly a showcase for the greatest talent that the League has to offer, should be a fun filled nine innings with players coming together from teams across the country to enjoy playing the game they all love, right?  Wrong.  The winning league of the All Star Game is granted home field advantage in the World Series, putting a rather large amount of importance on this event.  Should the selected managers for each side be more concerned with selecting the players they think deserve to play in the game or should they think deeper on the strategy side and pick the players that would give them the best chance of winning the game and securing the ever-so-important home field advantage come October? 

In many cases, there doesn’t have to be much of a contradiction between these two category choices.  The best players, those that not only the managers but the fans want to see as well, should be the ones that give their side the best chance of pulling out a victory.  That may be true for the majority of the starting players for the American and National League teams, but in typical All Star Game fashion, the “starters” are soon rotated out and/or switch positions so that the greatest number of these star players get their time on the diamond.  If the managers of each team are expected to not only balance the egos and playing times of the greatest talents in the League, but are also expected to win in order to secure the home field advantage, how is this game supposed to fulfill the criteria of being a relaxing and laid back event? 

This is one of the many debates that went through the mind of manager Ned Yost (from the Kansas City Royals) when selecting the American League All Star roster.  Was having Alex Rodriguez, now a designated hitter rather than a third baseman, as a backup on the roster to Nelson Cruz and Prince Fielder going to give them any greater of an opportunity to win the game than they would have without A-Rod on the roster?  Based on the lineup selected, that answer was no, but lets look at the numbers more closely. 

Player	HR’s	RBI’s	Batting Avg
Nelson Cruz	20	50	.301
Prince Fielder	14	54	.339
Alex Rodruquez	16	47	.280

Both Fielder and Cruz put up better overall numbers compared to Rodriguez, making it completely justifiable to leave him off the All Star roster. On top of losing the numbers game Alex brings a lot of the drama to most situations due to his detailed past. Due to all of these factors and more Yost decided not to grant Rodriguez his 15^th selection to the All Star lineup.      

Is this a big predicament in the sports world?  Yes, only because of the buzz that is constantly associated with A-Rod.  Was it the wrong choice?  I don’t believe so.  When looking at all the statistical data, as well as the way Rodriguez stacks up with the rest of the All-Star lineup, I do not have a problem with Yost’s decision to not select Rodriguez.  Will it hurt his legacy?  No – 14 All Star appearances instead of 15 – get ‘em next year, A-Rod.  What I think would be more helpful to his legacy would be winning a title now that his P.E.D. (performance enhancing drug) scandal is over and the fact that Derek Jeter has retired.  Significantly contributing to a Yankee pennant run would surely put him in better standing than sitting on the bench during this year’s All Star Game. 

By Michael Cannon

Class of 2017

Sociology Major 

     

SBN-metrics reinventing the game?

            When Robinson Canó first got called up to the major leagues, it was obvious he had a sweet swing.  It was smooth and short.  The eye test was used to rate players for years, before Billy Beane helped bring sabermetrics into mainstream scouting.  This has led to the development of various kinds of teams.  Some front offices try to build around players who walk and hit home runs, meaning an offensive outburst can come at any moment.  Others seek players that hit for average and can do the small things, like lay down a good sac bunt.  The five-tool method of evaluating a player still proves valid.  Power, contact, speed, fielding, and arm.  Those five tools have been increasingly divided in an effort to better rank players.  Looking at offense, the five tools can be adjusted:

Stat	Weight
Power
Horizontal velo off bat on ball in play	25%
Contact
% Contact on swings	25%
Eye
% Swings that are at strikes	10%
% Takes that are balls	10%
Speed
Top speed to 1st	5%
Top speed on bases	5%
Baserunning
# Steals	5%
Steal %	5%
X-Factor
% Runners in from 3rd, less than 2 outs	10%
	100%

Thanks to the installation of Statcast in all 30 MLB ballparks, there will be full information for all of these stats by the end of the season, at which point this tool will be applied to create a new metric, temporarily called the Offense Number.  Here is a breakdown of the areas:

·      Power—Velocity off the bat is becoming more and more prevalent.  But including only the horizontal component rewards line drive hitters, like Mike Trout, over players who might have a tendency to hit mile-high fly balls to short right field.

·      Contact—A fairly obvious one here, swings and misses are penalized.

·      Eye—While the rise of great relievers has led teams away from the “make the starter work, get to the pen” strategy, having a good eye is still pivotal to batting, Vlad Guerrero being the notable exception.

·      Speed/Baserunning—These go together like peanut butter and jelly, rewarding pure speed as well as smart baserunning.  Both steal stats are included so players who go 70 for 140 or 1 for 1 are not unfairly rewarded.

·      X-factor—A bit of a wildcard here, since doing the “little things” like grounding out to the right side to move a runner to third usually earn high fives, but no accolades.  This one accounts for the player who can hit a grounder to short with the infield deep, or sending a fly ball just deep enough to get the runner in.  A positive result should never be penalized.

At the end of the season, this metric will be evaluated and compared to traditional batting stats, to provide more insight into a new way to evaluate hitters.

By James Elliot 

Class of 2016

SBN Editor