Philadelphia 76er fans supporting their team
Tanking is a model for delayed
gratification, and current issue in the NBA. One team embracing it is the
Philadelphia 76ers, who have won 32 games within the past two seasons, which is
good for a 22% winning percentage. At one point, this team set a record, losing
26 consecutive games. One might ask, why is it in a team’s best interest to
lose so much? This post will address one cause of tanking: the NBA Draft.
In the NBA draft, the teams that
do not make the playoffs are entered into a lottery for the first pick of an up
and coming prospect. The winner of the lottery receives the first pick;
guaranteeing them a potential franchise-changing player. In a study conducted
by advanced statisticians in the sport of basketball, the number of expected
“win shares” was calculated by pick in the draft. Win shares are approximately
the number of wins a player is expected to be responsible for contributing. The
study concluded that number one overall picks generate 76.9 expected win shares
throughout their careers and 26.5 within the first four years of that player’s
career (Kubatko). Teams essentially control rookies for the first four years of
their careers, given the structure of entry-level contracts, so this 26.5
number is significant. Teams finishing in last place are given the highest odds
of obtaining this pick, at 25%. This is significant, as teams want the best
chance possible to acquire the next LeBron James or Tim Duncan at this spot of
the draft. Looking at teams losing early on in the playoffs- those with the
least chance of winning it all anyways- they have 0% odds at the first pick.
Also, they can expect about 6.0 to 9.4 win shares from their projected rookie
(Kubatko). This is a large discrepancy between the values of a pick from a
borderline playoff team and the worst team in the league. Now, putting this
into the scope of a five-year period, teams would be best off to tank and accumulate
a stockpile of elite talent.
Adding a high level prospect
would theoretically increase a team’s chances at winning in the upcoming year;
however, picking in the top-five does not necessarily guarantee a
franchise-altering player. The ultimate risk teams partake in is choosing to
select the next great center or next great guard. In recent years, the biggest
example of this debate is the 2007 NBA Draft, featuring Kevin Durant and Greg
Oden. After large amounts of debate, the Portland Trailblazers selected
eventual bust Greg Oden from Ohio State, passing on eventual NBA MVP Kevin
Durant. This is a prime example of a current trend spanning over the past ten
years: guards outperforming centers picked in the top-four. Looking at guards
selected in the top-four since 2005, they have averaged 6.64 win shares per
season, significantly more than centers, who have averaged 4.52. However, expanding
this analysis back to 1985, centers averaged 5.84 and guards averaged 5.61 win
shares per season (Kartje). This demonstrates the evolving nature of the NBA,
as the point guard position has seen a boom of success within recent years. Superstar
guards such as Chris Paul, Derrick Rose, and Stephen Curry have replaced big
men superstars such as Shaquille O’Neal, David Robinson, and Hakeem Olajuwon.
Given the current trend of guard
success, maybe teams should have given D’Angelo Russell or Emmanuel Mudiay a
better look in this year’s draft, and paused when considering Jahlil Okafor or
Karl-Anthony Towns. However, only time will tell whom the true winners of the
draft are.
The 2015 NBA draft results
By Luc Maynor
Class of 2018
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